First person judgments that are immune to error through misidentifi cation (IEM) are fundamental to self-conscious thought. Th e IEM status of many such judgments can be understood in terms of the possession conditions of the concepts they involve. However, this approach cannot be extended to fi rst person judgments based on autobiographical memory. Th e paper develops an account of why such judgments have the IEM property and how thinkers are able to exploit this fact in inference.
Immunity to error through misidentifi cation
Th e notion of immunity to error through misidentifi cation relative to the fi rst person pronoun was fi rst introduced in those terms by Sydney Shoemaker in 1968. Its intellectual antecedents go some way further back, however. As Shoemaker himself recognized, they can be traced to Wittgenstein's distinction in Th e Blue Book between uses of "I" as subject and uses of "I" as object. Here is Wittgenstein's statement of the distinction between the two diff erent types of use.
Th ere are two diff erent cases in the use of the word "I" (or "my") which I might call "the use as object" and "the use as subject". Examples of the fi rst kind of use are these: "My arm is broken," "I have grown six inches," "I have a bump on my forehead," "Th e wind blows my hair about." Examples of the second kind are: "I see so-and-so," "I try to lift my arm," "I think it will rain," "I have a toothache." (Wittgenstein 1958, 66f.) What distinguishes the two diff erent uses of "I" is that only the use as object permits a certain type of error.
One can point to the diff erence between these two categories by saying: Th e cases of the fi rst category involve the recognition of a particular person, and there is in these cases the possibility of an error, or, as I should rather put it: Th e possibility of an error has been provided for … It is possible that, say in an accident, I should feel a pain in my arm, see an arm at my side, and think it is mine when really it is my neighbour's. And I could, looking into a mirror, mistake a bump on his forehead for one on mine. On the other hand, there is no question of recognizing a person when I say I have toothache.
To ask "are you sure that it's you who have pains?" would be nonsensical. (Wittgenstein 1958, 67) Th e type of error that is possible in uses of "I" as object but not in uses of "I" as subject is an error of misidentifi cation. When a speaker makes a statement of the form "I am F" (or a thinker makes a judgment that would typically be expressed with those words), and when the "I" is being used as object, it is perfectly possible for the speaker to know that someone is F, but to misidentify herself as the person who is F. Th is type of error is not possible when "I" is being used as subject.
Th e distinction between "I" as subject and "I" as object is not absolute. Whether a given form of words counts as one or the other depends upon the context and, in particular, upon the evidence on which the assertion is based. So, to take one of Wittgenstein's examples, I might say "I have a toothache" because I feel a pain in my tooth. Th is would clearly be a use of "I" as subject. I cannot feel a pain and then wonder whether that pain is mine. Suppose, however, that I have an unlocalized pain in my lower jaw. I wonder where exactly the pain is and consult a neuroscientist who is able, using scanning technology, to locate the pain in my tooth. If I then say "I have a toothache" I would be using "I" as object because the possibility of error has entered the picture-my scan might have got mixed up with someone else's, for example, with the result that, although I am feeling pain, it is not actually me whose tooth is aching.
Shoemaker's characterization of immunity to error is evidence-relative in this sense. He writes:
To say that a statement "a is " is subject to error through misidentifi cation relative to the term 'a' means that the following is possible: Th e speaker knows some particular thing to be , but makes the mistake of asserting "a is " because, and only because, he mistakenly thinks that the thing he knows to be is what 'a' refers to. (Shoemaker 1968, 7f.) 
